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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
When the Social Security Act was amended to eliminate 
benefits for disability caused by alcohol and drug addiction, 
Congress divided the claimants into two groups. The 
district court decided that the distinction was based on 
whether the disability existed on the effective date of the 
amendment. We conclude, however, that the test is whether 
the claims had been "finally adjudicated by the 
Commissioner" before or after the effective date of the 
amendment. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the 
district court. 
 
After the denial of his original application for 
Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) benefits, the 
claimant, Edwin R. Cordova Torres, reapplied, relying 
principally on his alcoholism as the cause of his disability. 
In 1994, an ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council 
affirmed. Claimant filed his request for review by the 
district court in May 1995. On March 21, 1996, the district 
court remanded the case to the Commissioner "for further 
determination as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's 
alcohol problem, his ability to control his condition and his 
employability." 
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Almost two months later on May 16, 1996, the 
Commissioner filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the remand order because 
legislation enacted on March 29, 1996 eliminated 
alcoholism as a primary basis for SSI benefits. Exercising 
its discretion, the district court concluded that the 
Commissioner's motion was appropriate and considered it 
on the merits. 
 
The Commissioner contended that the amending 
legislation barred further consideration of the plaintiff's 
claim because it had not been "finally adjudicated by the 
Commissioner" before March 29, 1996, as required by the 
statute's effective date provision. The district court, 
however, read the effective date language as directed toward 
the existence or non-existence of disability on that day, 
thus exempting cases pending on the date of enactment. 
Accordingly, the court denied the Commissioner's motion. 
 
I. 
 
In view of the somewhat unusual procedural posture of 
this case, we must first determine whether the order is 
appealable. The district court's initial remand to the 
Commissioner called for further review of evidence already 
existing in the record. It was fifty-six days later when the 
Commissioner filed her motion arguing that the change in 
statutory law disposed of the claim in its entirety. Following 
the rejection of her contentions by the district court, the 
Commissioner appealed to this Court. 
 
Rule 60(b) provides that on motion "the court may relieve 
a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
. . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." Preliminarily, it would appear that an 
order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. See Brower v. Director, Ill. Dep't of 
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); Binker v. 
Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 744 (3d Cir. 1992); Daily 
Mirror, Inc. v. New York News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 
1976) ("An order denying relief under Rule 60(b) is an 
appealable order, but the appeal brings up only the 
correctness of the order itself"); 11 Charles Alan Wright, 
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Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 2871 (2d ed. 1995). 
 
There is an interdependence between the "finality" 
required for Rule 60(b) and section 1291. In some 
instances, the Court of Appeals may not entertain an 
appeal under section 1291 because the underlying order in 
the district court is purely interlocutory and, thus, not 
within the scope of Rule 60(b), which applies only to "final" 
judgments and orders. An example of that situation might 
be a discovery order or similarly preliminary step in 
litigation being conducted in the district court. 
 
In Kapco Manufacturing Co. v. C & O Enterprises, 773 
F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1985), a district court order 
directing the parties to reduce a settlement to writing was 
interlocutory, an "intermediate step" and not "final." Hence, 
the order was not within the scope of Rule 60(b) and, as 
such, not appealable under section 1291. See also St. 
Mary's Health Ctr. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 
1987) (order granting partial summary judgment on liability 
was interlocutory and not "final" under Rule 60(b) nor 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291). 
 
In Kapco, however, the Court pointed out the distinction 
between preliminary directives issued during the course of 
ordinary civil litigation, which the district court has the 
power to modify, and orders remanding a case to an 
administrative agency for reconsideration. Although such 
remand orders are usually interlocutory, see AJA 
Associates v. Army Corps of Engineers, 817 F.2d 1070, 
1073 (3d Cir. 1987), they are not always so. If, for example, 
a party alleges under Rule 60(b) that a remand had been 
procured by fraud, denial of the motion would be 
dispositive of that issue and "wrap up all matters pending 
on the docket," thus making the decision final. Kapco, 773 
F.2d at 153. 
 
As we noted in Horizons International, Inc. v. Baldridge, 
811 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1987), "interpretations of 
section 1291 announced in more garden variety civil 
litigation suits are not controlling" in reviews of agency 
actions. Such cases may present the issue "differently by 
virtue of the relief sought and the type of relief ordered." Id. 
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at 159. Although Horizons cited Marshall v. Celebrezze, 351 
F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1965) for the general proposition that a 
remand to the Secretary of HEW for the taking of additional 
evidence was interlocutory, id., we have recognized an 
exception for cases where barring appellate review is the 
practical result of those orders. United States v. Spears, 
859 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir. 1988); AJA Assocs., 817 F.2d at 
1073. In such instances, appeals are permissible. 
 
In Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990), the 
Supreme Court discussed the appealability of an order 
remanding a disability benefits case to the Secretary of 
HHS for a further review of the record. In the 
circumstances of that case, the practical effect of the 
remand was to abrogate some of the Secretary's 
regulations. 
 
The Court concluded that the remand order came within 
the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. S 405(g), which authorizes 
a district court to enter a "judgment affirming, modifying, 
or reversing the decision of the [Secretary], with or without 
remanding the cause for a rehearing." The Court doubted 
that the Secretary could later appeal, if on remand, he 
ordered payment of benefits. Consequently, the Secretary 
would be denied appellate review of the district court's 
ruling that invalidated the regulations. Id. at 625; see also 
Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
Finkelstein is not precisely on point because the remand 
order in the present case did not directly impair the 
Commissioner's ability to deny benefits. Moreover, it is not 
the remand that is before us, but the refusal to grant the 
Rule 60(b) motion. Therefore, it is the merits of that denial, 
and not the remand, that we must address. See Brower, 
434 U.S. at 263 n.7; Daily Mirror, 533 F.2d at 56. 
 
Nevertheless, the case here is in the same posture as that 
in Finkelstein. If we do not entertain the appeal at this time, 
on remand the claimant may receive an award of benefits, 
in which event he will not appeal, and it is very doubtful 
that the Commissioner could appeal. See Finkelstein, 496 
U.S. at 625. Consequently, the Commissioner would be 
unable to secure appellate review of the alcohol and drug 
abuse amendment as applied to this claim. 
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In the light of the circumstances present in this case, we 
conclude that because the claim on remand would likely 
escape appellate review, the district court properly 
considered that order as final for purposes of Rule 60(b) 
and appropriately considered the legal effect of the 
alcoholism amendment. Consequently, the denial of the 
motion is also final and appealable to this Court under 
section 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Congress amended Title II of the Social Security Act in 
1996 to bar the award of disability benefits based on 
alcoholism or drug addiction. The amendment, codified at 
42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(2)(C), reads as follows: "An individual 
shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this 
subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for 
this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the 
Commissioner's determination that the individual is 
disabled." 
 
On its face, the amendment's relevance to this case is not 
seriously questioned. The principal challenge is to the 
construction of the amendment's effective date as it applies 
to the claimant. 
 
The relevant statutory language states: "The amendments 
. . . shall apply to any individual who applies for, or whose 
claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner of Social 
Security with respect to, benefits under title II of the Social 
Security Act based on disability on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and, in the case of any individual 
who has applied for, and whose claim has been finally 
adjudicated by the Commissioner with respect to, such 
benefits before such date of enactment, such amendments 
shall apply only with respect to such benefits for months 
beginning on or after January 1, 1997." Pub. L. 104-121 
S 105(a)(5)(A), 110 Stat. at 853; 42 U.S.C. S 405 note (1996). 
 
The district court concluded that the claimant was not 
barred because his application for benefits was not "based 
on disability on or after" the effective date of the 
amendment, March 29, 1996. Therefore, he could receive 
benefits for the disability that existed before that time. 
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Similarly, the court believed that the claimant was not 
seeking payments that would be received after January 1, 
1997. Essentially, the district court's construction of the 
amendment rests on the proposition that the clause "on or 
after the date of the enactment" modifies the word 
"disability." The Commissioner, on the other hand, 
contends that the "on or after" clause modifies "applies for, 
or whose claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner." 
 
A number of district courts have discussed these two 
views of the statutory language and have labeled the former 
the "disability" and the latter the "adjudication" 
interpretation. Among the opinions adopting the disability 
construction are Hall v. Chater, No. 96C580 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
21, 1997) and Teitelbaum v. Chater, 949 F. Supp. 1206, 
1212-13 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Cases adopting the adjudication 
theory include Miller v. Callahan, 964 F. Supp. 939, 947 
(D.Md. 1997); Connor v. Chater, 947 F. Supp. 56, 60 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996); Sousa v. Chater, 945 F. Supp. 1312, 
1328-30 (E.D.Cal. 1996); Santos v. Chater, 942 F. Supp. 
57, 63 (D.Mass. 1996); Willis v. Chater, 939 F. Supp. 1236, 
1239-40 (W.D.Va. 1996). Two Courts of Appeals have 
referred to the amendment, but have not been required to 
construe its statutory language. See Perkins v. Chater, 107 
F.3d 1290 (7th Cir. 1997); Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
 
Claimant argues that the amendment should be applied 
prospectively only and relies on Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), in which the Court 
discussed the effect of retroactive legislation on vested 
substantive rights. Claimant reasons that because his 
disability existed before the amendment was enacted, he 
had a settled expectation of receiving benefits for the period 
before the effective date. 
 
Claimant has received no benefits and none have been 
awarded. His status is simply that of an applicant. 
Individuals in that category are entitled to procedural due 
process, see Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1303-05 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 
489-90 (3d Cir. 1980), but as the Supreme Court has 
reminded us, procedural due process does not impose a 
constitutional limitation on Congress' power to make 
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changes in eligibility for certain entitlements. Atkins v. 
Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). 
 
In Atkins, the Court rebuffed objections to a 
congressional reduction of food stamp benefits: "[I]t must 
be assumed that Congress had plenary power to define the 
scope and the duration of the entitlement to food-stamp 
benefits and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate those 
benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of 
the recipients' needs and the resources available to fund 
the program." 472 U.S. at 129. Continuing in the same 
theme, the Court said that when the legislature adjusts 
benefit levels that "determination provides all the process 
that is due." Id. at 129-30 (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982)); see also United 
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 
(1980) ("railroad benefits, like social security benefits, are 
not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at 
any time."). 
 
Thus, if a recipient's right to future benefits may be 
terminated by a statute, it follows that an applicant who 
has never been declared eligible may as well be deprived of 
an inchoate right. 
 
Claimant relies on the definition of "entitled" in Estate of 
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992), a case 
brought under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. S 901. There, the Supreme 
Court said that "the normal meaning of entitlement 
includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and 
it does not depend on whether the right has been 
acknowledged or adjudicated." Id. at 477. 
 
The question in Cowart was whether a person who had 
sustained an injury in the workplace was an individual 
"entitled to compensation" under the Act and, as such, 
required to obtain his employer's consent before settling a 
tort claim against a third party. 
 
We note that the word "entitled" does not appear in the 
effective date provisions of the alcoholism amendment. 
Furthermore, usage in the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act does not carry over naturally to the 
circumstances before us. Cowart did not address the 
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retroactivity problems of legislation affecting vested 
entitlements. 
 
More fundamentally, Landgraf discussed a statute that 
did not disclose Congress' will on retroactivity. The 
amendment at issue before us, however, does set out when 
it will apply in terms that are sufficiently clear to provide 
necessary guidance. See also Lindh v. Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 
No. 96-6298, 1997 WL 338568, at * 4 (U.S. June 23, 1997) 
(normal rules of construction apply in determinations of a 
statute's temporal reach). 
 
The amendment focuses on when a claim is filed or 
adjudicated. We are convinced that, grammatically, "after 
the date of enactment" modifies the clause, "whose claim is 
finally adjudicated by the Commissioner." The amendment 
thus establishes two separate groups who are affected in 
different ways. 
 
1. Those whose claims were not "finally adjudicated by 
the Commissioner" before March 29, 1996. The individuals 
in this group receive no benefits. The Commissioner asserts 
that the claimant falls into this category. 
 
2. Those whose claims have been favorably and "finally 
adjudicated by the Commissioner" before the effective date 
of the amendment, March 29, 1996. The individuals in this 
group had been receiving payments and were granted a 
grace period until January 1, 1997 during which they could 
adjust to the loss of the monthly income after that date and 
perhaps reapply for benefits based on other disabilities. 
There is a reasonable basis for the distinction between the 
two categories -- the people who have never obtained 
payment do not have the need to adjust as do those who 
have received benefits in the past. 
 
Strong support of the adjudication interpretation also lies 
in the well-settled tenet of statutory construction that all 
provisions of the statute must be construed together to give 
each some independent meaning. Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 
82 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1996). The language 
applied to first category situations fits neatly when the 
focus is on the date of adjudication. If a claim isfiled, or 
finally adjudicated, post-enactment, the amendments apply 
in full. 
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In contrast, if the focus is on the date of disability, then 
the "final adjudication" language in the first category 
becomes superfluous. Stated another way, if an individual 
files a claim based upon a post-enactment disability, then 
the date of final adjudication would be irrelevant because 
the claim would have been void ab initio. Thus, in this 
reading of the statute there is no phrase that explains in a 
temporal way which applications are covered. 
 
The weakness of the disability interpretation adopted by 
the district court may be further demonstrated by an 
examination of the results of applying it to the two 
categories. In the first group (those whose claims had not 
been "finally adjudicated"), payments "based on disability 
on or after" March 29, 1996 would not be made, although 
by implication benefits could be awarded for periods of 
disability before that date. This result, although strained, is 
not beyond reason.1 
 
However, when the disability interpretation is applied to 
the second category, the fallacy of this approach becomes 
apparent. The point is illustrated by repeating below the 
language that applies to the second category and inserting 
the modifying language from the first category in brackets. 
It reads: "[A]nd, in the case of any individual . . . whose 
claim has been finally adjudicated by the Commissioner 
with respect to, such benefits [based on disability] before 
[March 29, 1996], such amendments shall apply only with 
respect to such benefits [based on disability before March 
29, 1996] for months beginning on or after January 1, 
1997." 
 
The result is confusing to say the least. Among other 
things it leads to the question of whether benefits are due 
for disability between March 29, 1996 and January 1, 
1997. 
 
It is persuasive, however, that the second category 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note, however, that SSI benefits are not payable for a period prior 
to a claimant's application. 20 C.F.R. S 416.335; see also Cruse v. 
Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, if a claimant applied 
for SSI benefits based on alcoholism after March 29, 1996, the claim 
would have to be based on disability after that date. 
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description deletes the words "based on disability" and 
refers instead to a claim that "has been finally adjudicated 
. . . with respect to, such benefits before . . . enactment." 
Thus, when date of enactment is tied to a claim that has 
been finally adjudicated, the meaning becomes quite clear 
-- benefits awarded before the date of enactment continue 
until January 1, 1997. Not only is this approach clearer, it 
is consistent with the legislative history. 
 
The Ways and Means Committee Report discusses the 
effective date of the legislation as follows: "Generally, 
changes apply to benefits for months beginning on or after 
the date of enactment. However, an individual entitled to 
benefits before the month of enactment would continue to 
be eligible for benefits until January 1, 1997." H.R. Rep. 
104-379, 1st Sess. 17 (1995). The tenor of the Report also 
reflected Congressional intent to end benefits sooner rather 
than later. "The intent of this proposal is to eliminate 
payment of cash Social Security and SSI disability benefits 
to alcoholics and drug addicts" and channel part of the 
savings into treatment programs. Id. 
 
Implicit in claimant's argument is the notion of 
unfairness. But drawing lines is the business of Congress 
and inevitably individuals on the wrong side of the division 
do not fare well. The result is unfortunate for those 
adversely affected, but arbitrariness is often unavoidable. 
 
Our study of the statute convinces us that it is the date 
of adjudication, and not the time when disability exists, 
that triggers the application of the effective date. "The 
upshot is that our analysis accords more coherence to [the 
amendment] than any rival we have examined. That is 
enough." Lindh, 1997 WL 338568 at *8. 
 
A remaining issue requires us to interpret the meaning of 
the term "finally adjudicated by the Commissioner." Some 
district court opinions hold that after the claim reaches the 
district court it has been "finally adjudicated by the 
Commissioner." See, e.g., Santos, 942 F. Supp. at 64; 
Willis, 939 F. Supp. at 1241. 
 
In light of the circumstances in this case, we have no 
difficulty in concluding that the claim has not been "finally 
adjudicated." The case was remanded by the district court 
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to the Commissioner for the specific purpose of further 
adjudication. A claim subject to further hearing by the 
Commissioner cannot be "finally adjudicated." 
 
We conclude that the claim in this case is barred by the 
statutory amendment.2 Accordingly, the order of the district 
court will be reversed and the case will be remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
 
         A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Congress amended the relevant provisions ofS 105(b)(5) on August 5, 
1997 as applicable to SSI claims. The current version reads: 
 
         (D) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual's claim, with 
         respect to supplemental security income benefits under title XVI 
of 
         the Social Security Act based on disability, which has been 
denied 
         in whole before the date of the enactment of this Act, may not be 
         considered to be finally adjudicated before such date if, on or 
after 
         such date -- 
 
         (i) there is pending a request for either administrative or 
judicial 
         review with respect to such claim, or 
 
         (ii) there is pending, with respect to such claim, a 
readjudication 
         by the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to relief in a 
class 
         action or implementation by the Commissioner of a court remand 
         order." 
 
         Technical Amendments Relating to Drug Addicts and Alcoholics, 
         Balanced Budget Act of 1997, SS 5525, 5528. We find no need to 
         consider either the application of this statutory change to the 
case 
         before us, or its retroactivity. 
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